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Introduction
In many countries science curricula now represent science as including not only 'the products' of science (the substantive facts, theories and laws, sometimes referred to as the content knowledge (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013)) but also 'the processes and characteristics of the scientific enterprise' (Roberts, 2011, p. 12) . These developments all share the broad aim of Scientific Literacy (Bybee, 1997; DeBoer, 2000; Laugksch, 2000; Roberts, 1982 Roberts, , 2007 . Despite being 'a rather polysemic expression' (Martin, 2011, p. 90 ) a common feature is to 'understand the methods by which science derives the evidence for the claims made by scientists, [and] to appreciate the strengths and limits of scientific evidence' (Millar & Osborne, 1998 , p. 2004 . Large-scale international science assessments such as PISA (OECD, 2013) and TIMSS (Jones, Wheeler & Centurino, 2013) also reflect this curriculum emphasis (Kind, 2013a) . Since DeBoer (2011, p. 569) suggests that 'in some countries … the approach is to match educational programs to the framework that is guiding the development of the 2 international assessments' it is reasonable to assume that attention to 'the doing of science' as well as the traditional substantive content substantive will become even more widespread.
Over the years, how this 'doing of science' has been conceived and expressed in the research, policy and assessment literature has differed (Hofstein & Lunetta, 2004; Jenkins, 2009; Kind, 2013a; OECD, 2013) . For many decades, it was conceived in terms of various 'processes' to be acquired through practice (Millar & Driver, 1987) .
However, recognition that the 'doing' is 'supported by the integration of science concepts and processes, metacognitive processes, critical reasoning skills, and cultural aspects of science ' (Cavagnetto, 2010, p. 337 ; emphasis added) has come to recent prominence. Many researchers (e.g., Lederman, et al., 2014; Lubben, Sadeck, Scholtz, & Braund, 2010; Roberts & Gott, 2010; Schalk, van der Schee, & Boersma, 2013; Tytler, 2007) have moved beyond describing what scientists do (wherein any understanding may be implicit) and explicitly articulate some of the ideas required to understand evidence since:
At the core, science is fundamentally about establishing lines of evidence and using the evidence to develop and refine explanations using theories, models, hypotheses, measurements, and observations. (National Research Council, [NRC], 2007, p. 18) The PISA 2015 Draft Science Framework (OECD, 2013) addresses the importance of evidence in both its 'procedural knowledge' and 'epistemic knowledge' elements and argues that PISA's 2015 definition [of scientific literacy] represents 'a more detailed specification of particular aspects that were embedded or assumed in earlier definitions' (OECD, 2013, p. 10) , thus recognising the importance of making the implicit explicit and clarifying the construct for assessment (Wiliam, 2010) . (NRC, 2012 ) the dimension of 'Scientific and Engineering practices' corresponds to understanding evidence. The document states that 'engaging in scientific investigation requires not only skill but also knowledge that is specific to each practice' (p. 31; emphasis added).
In the US, the new Framework for K-12 Science Education
Other recent developments (including Achieve, Inc., 2013; Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2012 ; Department for Education, [DfE], 2014) and science education research (e.g., Lederman et al., 2014) give greater emphasis to students being able to understand the diversity of scientific empirical practice; the important relationship between substantive knowledge and this 'doing' aspect; and the importance of students being able to use their understanding to evaluate empirical work and reason with evidence as well as being able to carry out practical work.
Evaluating empirical evidence requires understanding about the validity of data. This understanding represents the 'thinking behind the doing' of science. In 1994, Millar, Lubben, Gott and Duggan called these 'concepts of evidence' and subsequently a knowledge base to develop an understanding of empirical evidence has been specified (Gott, Duggan, Roberts and Hussain, n.d.) .
Viewing scientific practice as a conceptual knowledge base to be understood rather than skills or processes to be acquired represents an ontological shift in its characterisation. While recent curriculum documents reflect this shift, since scientific practice is concerned with 'doing', curriculum specifications tend to describe the processes involved and the conceptual basis -important for teaching and assessmentis not always so explicit. Furthermore, since the process view and its association with a single scientific method are so deep rooted in customary school science, as shown by Abrahams & Millar (2008) , there is the danger that the significance of the conceptual shift inherent in the new curriculum documents could be lost if curriculum developers, awarding bodies and teachers interpret them from a process perspective.
Concept maps (Novak & Gowin, 1984) are widely used to represent substantive understanding in science (e.g., Johnson & Papageorgiou, 2010; Kinchin, 2010; Shymansky et al., 1997) . Equally, if 'the thinking behind the doing' is also a knowledge base of concepts to be understood (rather than 'processes' to be routinely mastered) it ought to be possible to represent that understanding with a concept map (Novak, 2010) . A concept map should help to emphasise the difference between an underpinning 'conceptual' characterisation of scientific practice necessary for meaningful learning (Novak & Cañas, 2007) and a surface description of processes.
This article presents an attempt to produce a concept map for understanding the validity of data.
The map is informed by the concepts of evidence and their inter-relationships (Gott, Duggan, Roberts and Hussain, n.d.) . The current version has been derived from more than a decade of our, and colleagues', research, teaching and assessment. It has been 4 through many iterations following discussions at both professional and academic conferences and has recently been informed by ideas from Cañas, Novak and Reiska (2015) with the aim of it having explanatory power, being clear and concise and having balance (Kinchin, 2015) .
Our map (Figure 1 ) centralises the question of the concept of validity of data since the degree of confidence in the validity gives it weight as empirical evidence for a claim. The network of ideas drawn on in judging the validity of data represents an understanding about the quality of data. This understanding is inextricably linked with substantive understanding and those concepts directly informed by substantive knowledge are highlighted with a shadow on the box. To reiterate, by substantive knowledge we include 'facts', laws, models and theories of the disciplinary sciences.
We would suggest that the map as a whole encompasses most if not all of 'scientific practice' in schools.
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
We have not seen the understanding of evidence being addressed through a concept map in the literature and believe this offers a valuable perspective for science education. The map of the conceptual relationships helps to highlight important points that are not always so easy to communicate to a wider audience more attuned to a process view. As a concept map, it is important to distinguish it from a flow diagram; it does not represent any particular procedure or approach. The map is structured from the perspective of carrying out an investigation i.e. data is being collected to answer a question.
In this article, firstly, we will explain the meaning of the terms and propositions in our map, using examples to illustrate how the ideas and their relationships are applied in the 'thinking behind the doing'. The map does not represent the processes but shows the thinking -the ideas and their inter-relationships -behind decisions; so we give examples from different areas of science to exemplify the application of the ideas as they inform practice. Since the arrows are not processes, but are conceptual links, there is not necessarily any one starting point or direction of travel in practice.
However, for convenience in our explanation we will work systematically through the map. After examining its detail we go on to consider some important general points which emerge from the map as a whole with respect to the nature of science, the notion of 'scientific method' and the relationship between substantive theory and scientific practice. Finally we address how the ontological shift in the characterisation of scientific practice from routine process to conceptual understanding has implications for practical work in schools.
A concept map for understanding the validity of data
We will explain our map with particular reference to two contrasting investigations; called Springboard ( Figure 2 ) and Shrimp (Figure 3 ). These investigations allow us to discuss the understanding represented by the whole map. We recognise that some scientific practices may only focus on specific regions.
<<INSERT FIGs 2 + 3 ABOUT HERE>> Broadly speaking, Figure 1 has two inter-related sides. On the left is thinking about variables and on the right thinking about measurement. We will start with variables.
Variables
All investigations involve defined variables. These variables are the creation of existing substantive knowledge -they constitute the disciplines biology, chemistry, physics, earth science etc. Scientific observation is dependent on 'seeing the world' through science's 'conceptual spectacles'. As Lederman et al. (2014, p. 68) (Haigh, France, & Gounder, 2012) .
Variables can be categoric, where the value is descriptive (e.g. a material or species) or continuous, where the value lies on a numeric scale. (e.g. length, temperature).
Although rooted in the scientific conceptualisation of our world, the variables of Springboard do not draw on specialised knowledge. With regard to load, there is no need to distinguish between mass and weight, and distance is part of everyday thinking. Explanations may use ideas relating to force and motion, but that is another matter (see later). Shrimp draws more directly on scientific knowledge. It involves the identification of freshwater shrimp Gammarus pulex (a genus of freshwater amphipod crustacean) and other variables such as water speed, pH and oxygen concentration. Substantive theory can inform the thinking, but trial runs will be needed to explore a suitable range in the circumstances. Interval can also be important, especially where closer readings are helpful in picking up any maximum, minimum or inflection points.
Decisions about intervals of the IV can also be made iteratively, in response to the data gathered, with an eye on any emergent pattern. Again, substantive thinking can lead to the anticipation of such eventualities. The idea of range can also apply to a categoric independent variable; for example, in a question exploring a property of materials one would need to decide how many different materials to test. 
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The naturally occurring values of any independent variable have to be chosen (rather than actively changed) to capture the natural range of any IV considered in the stream and the range would need to be considered too in relation to the magnitude of any effect which will become clearer during data collection. Site selections for the values of the IV could be random, or they could be selected and consider as stratified (encompassing the range of velocities, say). As measurements are taken throughout the stream, the investigator would have to consider whether enough intervals for any variable considered as an IV had been measured to identify any potential pattern.
Measurement
Variables have Our definition of an instrument also includes the totality of how it is used to measure a particular variable. For Springboard one instrument for measuring height reached could be 'using a metre rule and sighting by eye' and another could be 'a metre rule and recording by video'. The former would have a greater degree of uncertainty associated with judging the highest point of the trajectory. In Shrimp, the instrument 9 for measuring the number of shrimp is 'kick sampling' ii . The number of netted shrimp can be carefully counted, but there will be uncertainty about the precise area disturbed, the proportion of shrimp dislodged and the proportion of those actually caught in the net.
An instrument, then, can only measure a continuous variable to a region (not a point) and its accuracy relates to how close that region is to the true value. For an accurate measurement, we would expect the true value to lie within the region. A systematic error can arise if the scale is not calibrated correctly.
Sometimes it is not possible to measure a variable directly and a proxy is used instead iii . For Shrimp, the most relevant water speed will be that at the bottom.
However, without very sophisticated instruments this will be difficult to measure.
Instead, a pragmatic decision may be made to measure 'water speed at the surface'.
How well this substitute stands in will be open to debate.
The concept of measurement (although often referred to as 'observation'; see, for instance Gray, 2014) can also be applied to a categoric variable, where qualitative descriptions are the values. Here, the measurement entails the recognition of the defining features of the variable, with the substantively-informed discernment of the observer acting like an instrument. Our Shrimp investigation rests on the capacity to distinguish G. pulex from other creatures. There may be uncertainty with some specimens. Placing vegetation into different categories will also require judgment iv .
Reliability of the DV
With a single measurement of the DV, we only know an approximate value of the DV for what will also be approximate values of the IV and CVs. In many cases, this is all that is possible and the quality of the data and patterns will be judged with recourse to the ideas below but without being able to apply them empirically. Where the other variables are readily manipulated, the reliability of the DV can be assessed by repeated 'takes'. Here, the degree of uncertainty associated with each instrument of the investigation makes a combined impact on each value of the DV measured. In setting up for each take, the starting conditions will only be the same within the limits of the instruments and differences may result in a different value of the DV being recorded (subject to the uncertainty of the DV instrument).
For Springboard, the important variables such as overhang, load and toy figure can be left unchanged between 'takes' and perhaps only the position of the toy figure might vary slightly giving differences in trajectory. Other experiments may require more remeasuring out of quantities in setting up each time.
However, the reliability of the DV will also depend on what we call the repeatability of the event. By this we mean the extent to which all other confounding variables have been identified and controlled. For Springboard, we may not have thought about the cutting of the string. It will be important to have a sharp pair of scissors since any snagging or pulling on the string will affect how bent the ruler is on point of release.
Although identified, we may not have been able to control for air currents. As noted earlier, the identification of confounding variables is as good as our substantive understanding of the situation.
Increasing the number of repeats, if possible, narrows down the region where we can say the true value of the DV lies (for each value of the IV in a region according to its measurement). Statistically speaking, increasing the number of repeats reduces the standard deviation of the mean, otherwise known as standard error (SE = SD/√n). We can be 68% confident that the true value lies in the region between one SE either side of the experimental mean value. Extending the region to two SE either side of the experimental mean gives a 95% probability of covering the location of the true value.
What constitutes a good enough reliability is a matter of judgment in the circumstances. The key issue here is how the SE of the DV compares to the magnitude of any change over the range of the IV, since this will determine the extent to which any intrinsic relationship can emerge feasible, the number of repeats will need to be increased until the SE is small enough to reach a conclusion. Substantive understanding of the various factors will inform the best course of action. For Springboard, the uncertainty in judging the highest point by eye will most likely be the biggest contributor to the variation and the use of video technology would be worthwhile. If not available, since the time for a take is relatively short, a large number of repeats is feasible.
We have focussed on the reliability of the DV, but the need for repeated measurements can also apply to other variables. For example, in Shrimp, the velocity at the surface can be measured by timing a floating object (such as a ball) travelling a fixed distance downstream, such as one metre. However, since the movement of the object will be affected by inconsistencies of wind and eddies a number of repeats will be necessary to establish the variation and a good enough mean for comparison with other sites.
Repeated measurements of a variable are not always practicable or even possible and any assumptions must always be acknowledged in the interpretation of the data. The disruptive kick sampling in Shrimp prohibits repeated readings of the DV in the same spot on the same occasion. One way round this would be to sample in adjacent sites where conditions are similar. Another would be to return at a later date after the stream has had the chance to settle down (if the different time of year was not an issue). Collecting data from other streams (with similar key characteristics) would also be useful. The aim is to collect as much relevant data as possible (subject to ethical constraints). By having many sites the intervals of all IVs would most likely be smaller, which would also help to better establish any pattern in the data. As with shrimp numbers and water velocity, if the effect of changing the IV is greater than the variation, a scatter plot will indicate a trend and the strength in the relationship can be quantified through the use of statistics such as the correlation coefficient and its probability.
Before completing our consideration of reliability, we must mention 'human error' which for reasons given below, is excluded from the map.
Human Error
We have noted the constraints of our sense organs when incorporated into an instrument (e.g. judging highest point of flight or accurate identification of specimens). However, that people can be sloppy and make mistakes is self-evident.
That there is an inherent variation in the measurement of a DV, no matter how carefully done, is the crucial point to understand. It can then be appreciated how very tightly manipulated contexts can lead to little variation (or no variation that can be picked up by our instruments). Too much emphasis on 'anomalous' readings arising from 'human error' carries the danger of offering an easy distraction -sliding to all variation being put down to human error (Fairbrother & Hackling, 1997) .
Variables that are objects
Returning to the left side of the map, where an object is involved in an investigation, we must consider the variation amongst objects of that type. For living things, sizeable variation between individuals in their behaviour is to be expected and needs to be considered. In our Shrimp survey, we assume that we find enough shrimp to have a representative sample of the species. A reason to count the shrimp at a large number of sites is to increase the number sampled. In a lab-based modelling of the stream, we would need to decide on a number of shrimp to use -we could not go on the behaviour of one shrimp. Similarly, an investigation to establish the effect of different fertilizers on the yield of tomatoes will need more than a few tomato plants.
What constitutes a good enough number of specimens (sample size) will depend on the variation in the data in comparison to the magnitude of the effect on changing the IV (as with deciding on the number of DV repeats). For the lab-based stream model, the variation relates to how the numbers at each site change as shrimp move about. For the tomato investigation, the variation will be in the yield per plant.
Social science and medical studies will select groups through a screening process on confounding variables. If a 'male middle class smoker and drinker' is put in the treatment group, then a matched 'male middle class smoker and drinker' is also put in the comparison (control) group. Of course, what counts as 'male', 'middle class', 'smoker' and 'drinker' will need to be defined. If sample groups are large enough one can move into the territory of a randomised controlled trial (RCT). Subjects are assigned to treatment groups by a random process. With a large enough sample size it can be assumed the multifarious confounding variables will even out so the only difference overall is the treatment applied to one group and not the other.
For objects manufactured under tight quality control we expect little variation in their characteristics and a small sample, if not just one specimen, is often assumed to be representative. In the case of Springboard, presuming no significant wear and tear, we would expect any relationship found for one ruler to apply to all rulers of that type.
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Our investigation would not involve testing lots of the same type of ruler. In chemistry, the objects are 'substances' where we expect no variation within a type but where the purity of a sample is an important issue.
Peer review
We have introduced our map from the perspective of the investigator. The ideas relating to variables and measurement are equally important from the perspective of others. The first consideration in the evaluation of any claim, be that by peer review (both before and after publication) or, less formally, by any sceptical person, is the validity of any presented data. Sufficient information must be known about the circumstances with respect to variables under which the data were generated and the reliability of measurements in order to judge the quality of the data and the limits of a claim. In the UK, the Royal Society's motto '"Nullius in verba" which roughly translates as "take nobody's word for it" … is an expression of the determination … to verify all statements by an appeal to facts determined by experiment' vi (n.d.). The specific claim from any empirical work should reflect the decisions made in the application of the understanding shown in the map and the confidence in the pattern.
Once data are judged good enough to reveal a distinct pattern, there is then the issue of its interpretation. Explanations and the appropriateness of any generalisations beyond the data will draw on existing knowledge and theory. The relationship between evidence and explanation takes us into the complex area of the philosophy of science which our map does not expand upon. In the next section we confine ourselves to a few key points relevant to school science that ensue from linking evidence back to existing substantive theory
Discussion
As noted earlier, we suggest that the recognition of a conceptual basis for understanding the quality of data represents an ontological shift with respect to widespread characterisations of scientific practices. We would argue that this has implications for addressing some long-standing issues in science education research, policy, curricula and practice.
Our map focuses on the ideas involved in carrying out a scientific investigation or inquiry from initial observation to judging the quality of the data, and firstly we turn to how this understanding underpins the resultant claim and its position in the broader substantive theory. This is important for an understanding about the nature of science (NOS).
Evidence and explanation

Causality
Where a relationship is found, it could be causal, an association or pure chance.
Acceptance of causality depends on there being a mechanism from established substantive theory that explains how one isolated variable could cause the change in another. In the case of the Springboard, there is little doubt that the ruler is directly causing the figure to fly upwards and that a greater distortion (load) gives a greater height reached. In Shrimp, the distribution of Gammarus does change with the water velocity but the latter is not thought to be directly caused by the former. Here, the explanation relates to the co-variation of velocity with dissolved oxygen concentrations, substrate size and available food. The relationship between water velocity and shrimp numbers is an association. The almost perfect correlation between margarine consumption and divorce rate in the US state of Maine (Fletcher, 2014) would appear to arise by pure chance.
Prediction and retrodiction
Perhaps the defining characteristic of scientific theory is the way it responds to new evidence and moreover how it enables predictions (hypotheses) to be made, which in turn may be tested by experimentation. If valid (as far as can be judged) data do not agree with the prediction, some accommodation in the theory is needed, which could range from amendment to abandonment. In the case with some examples from the 'historical sciences' (Gray, 2014) where testing is not possible (other than by modelling), the 'prediction' or 'retrodiction' can be about other instances of the phenomenon that has already occurred or other lines of evidence:
Retrodiction … is the process of inferring the past from the present... Darwin, for example, retrodicted that many intermediate forms of life would be found in the fossil record … Similarly, cosmologists were able to retrodict from the big bang theory the existence of cosmic microwave background radiation (Gray, 2014, p. 333) .
Competing theories
Sometimes the connection between variables can be determined empirically but the relationship could be explained by very different theories. For instance, that the time for a candle to extinguish within an upturned jar depends on the volume of contained air is readily demonstrated. However, in the late 18 th Century, proponents of the established phlogiston theory and the newly proposed oxygen theory disputed the explanation. The eventual acceptance of the oxygen theory occurred after a body of evidence, from different empirical works, accumulated and, following judgement by peers, was considered to be the most parsimonious explanation consistent with the evidence. Here the combustion of hydrogen to give water as the only product was decisive (Conant, 1957) . Scientific theories are tentative and underdetermined by the evidence (Jimenez-Aleixandre, Rodriguez & Duschl, 2000; Lederman et al., 2014) .
Overall, it is important to appreciate that theory is not evidence. However, a person's theoretical persuasion has a strong influence on what is sought and accepted as evidence. There is the danger that poor data are accepted uncritically because they fit with expectations and sound data are dismissed on superficial grounds because they don't. Such influences are at play in peer review and political circles, as well as in science classrooms (which we discuss further below).
There is no single scientific method
The concept map represents an understanding of the validity of data and contains no ordered series of procedures or processes. It is not a flow diagram of the sort that is often associated with descriptions of scientific 'chains of practice' (Kinchin & Hay, 2007) . The arrow directions in conjunction with the linking terms are there to represent the propositional relationships which give meaning to the concepts and do not imply a procedural sequence. To reiterate, this is a map of the 'thinking behind the doing', whatever form the 'doing' might take (Roberts & Gott, 2003) . The conceptual overview represents a network of intricately linked ideas, and decisions when investigating are based on nuanced application of these ideas, involving mental juggling as juxtapositions and contingencies are considered according to context. In terms of validity, there is no distinction between approaches (such as an 'experimental approach' or an 'observational approach') to finding patterns in data (Cleland, 2002) .
No one approach is privileged over another; the key issue is what is appropriate depending on the circumstances, as illustrated by Springboard and Shrimp. Of itself, the map embodies the realisation that 'there is no single set or sequence of steps followed in all investigations' (Lederman, et al., 2014, p. 68) .
Understanding of the ideas in the map is demonstrated in practice during trials or iterative working; the 'thinking behind the doing' becomes evident. As noted earlier, trials are conducted prior to main data collection and are important to determine the range and interval of the IV, the means of control for confounding variables, and how best to deal with any variation in the data to see if a pattern can be distinguished. The investigator tends to work more iteratively at the start of an investigation and then more linearly once the quality of the data has been established, although decisions about anomalous data, the size of the sample or number of repeats cannot be predetermined and must be considered, in relation to the data collected and whether it is good enough for the claim, throughout the whole investigation. Investigation, as Hodson (2014, p. 13) states 'is an organic, dynamic, interactive activity, a constant interplay of thought and action'. This explains how different investigators, even if approaching a problem in a similar way, may make different justified decisions in response to the ideas -reflecting their 'constraining assumptions' (Fortus, 2009, p. 86) -with concomitant effects on their data.
The inter-play of these ideas in relation to context is illustrated by different approaches to repeating readings (Heinicke & Heering, 2013) . In Springboard the reliability of the data, requires sufficient repeated measurements to 'capture' the variation and give a small enough standard error. However, in circumstances where the event is highly repeatable and specialised instruments have a very small degree of uncertainty, repeating until the same measured value occurs consistently (say, twice)
is a sensible approach (e.g. many titrations in chemistry). Any small differences between repeated readings can be ascribed to 'operator error' and in such 
Substantive knowledge and scientific practice are inseparable
The map emphasises the intimate integration of substantive knowledge (the shadowed concept boxes) with scientific practice. Neither stands alone, each is only as good as the other. The production of data is conceived within, is guided by and uses instruments that depend on existing substantive knowledge. The soundness of substantive knowledge depends on the quality of the originating data as evidence. We have already touched on the relationship between theory and evidence. Student engagement in interpretation, evaluation and argumentation has been strongly advocated in recent research literature (Kuhn, 1993; Lubben et al., 2010) . However, the argumentation research tends to focus on the fit between theory and evidence without examining the quality of data behind the 'evidence' (Gott & Duggan, 2007) .
Although this allows students to learn about argumentation per se it provides little opportunity for them to engage with the ideas in the map. For example, in a socioscientific context about the funding of a zoo (Osborne, Erduran & Simon, 2004, p. 1009) the information furnished for the argument is that:
… 'some animals wouldn't be able to breed in the wild' and there is a warrant supplied that this is because 'they may not have enough food.'
This claim is further supported or elaborated by the claim that 'the animals need a safe place to live' and the data to support this claim are that otherwise 'they will be at risk from predators'.
All of the claims are accepted without evidence to support these assertions. Even when empirical data are provided, activities that focus on students' reasoning and their use of evidence (rather than opinion or inference) to support explanations may not provide opportunities for the quality of the data to be questioned. For instance, in detailed work by Berland and Reiser (2009) students' arguments about population numbers were deemed to be more persuasive when they included statements like 'research showed', suggesting some acceptance of the authority of the research and the quality of the data presented seemed not to be questioned. Duschl and Osborne (2002, p. 55) note that 'the challenge is to provide teachers and students with tools that help them build on nascent forms of student argumentation to develop more sophisticated forms of scientific discourse'. We would suggest that the ideas about the quality of data are indispensable and that the whole of our map is addressed across argumentation activities. These tools move towards giving students the means to evaluate 'the goodness, the normative status, or epistemic forcefulness of candidate reasoning for belief, judgement, and action' (Siegel, 1995, p. 162, emphasis in original) and are therefore important in both the construction and critique of claims (Ford & Foreman, 2006) .
Overall, the appreciation of ideas about the quality of data and the relationship between substantive knowledge and scientific practice lie at the heart of understanding about the nature of science (NOS). The specification of what might be appropriate at school level is under debate (see for instance Abd-El-Khalick, 2012; Hodson & Wong, 2014) . There is no space to enter into this debate here but we suggest that an understanding of our map would go a long way towards a desirable understanding of the NOS; a contention seemingly supported by Kind's (2013b) analysis of NEAP, PISA and TIMSS science assessment scales. Indeed, as well as informing curriculum developers and awarding bodies, we believe the map would serve as a useful instrument for teachers when developing students' epistemic understanding about scientific knowledge. Here, reference to the history of science can help to illustrate the interaction of scientific knowledge with scientific practice.
For example, early work on the volumes of gases did not identify temperature and pressure as confounding variables (Conant, 1957) . A current example where we are as uncertain about the phenomena as our predecessors were is whether data are good enough evidence for the existence of gravity waves or better explained by space dust (Cowen, 2014) .
Implications for the role of practical work in science education
Viewing scientific practice as a network of ideas to be understood has significant implications for the role of practical work in science education, its specification in curricula and its assessment (Roberts & Gott, 2006) . By practical work we mean activities where students engage with materials and apparatus and make qualitative observations and/or quantitative measurements (after Abrahams and Millar's (2008) definition). There will still be the need to develop manual skills and awareness of techniques, and for the customary illustrative-type practicals that teachers are familiar with. The purpose of illustrative practicals is to acquaint students with the variables science uses to describe the world and so support the learning of substantive knowledge and theory. Students need to learn how to recognise objects (for example, plant and animal cells when viewing suitably prepared samples through a microscope)
or to recognise phenomena (such as dissolving or boiling). Illustrative practicals also exemplify known relationships between variables. To ensure the intended outcome, these can be presented to students as a 'recipe' wherein all the decisions about the design to establish a valid pattern have already been made. In the physical sciences, matters can be contrived to give a small variation in comparison to the effect of changing the IV so that only a few repeated measurements of the DV suffices (three, at most, will do). In biological contexts, where variation is inherent, collection of large datasets -often by many students pooling their results -is often needed to illustrate a relationship unambiguously.
Of course, in a recipe-type practical teachers can make a point of analysing the reasoning behind the design, but the first priority is developing the substantive understanding and one must be mindful of overloading students. In contrast to illustrative practicals there is also the need for activities aimed at developing students'
understanding of the quality of data; i.e. the ideas in our map. This will involve students carrying out their own scientific investigations so that they can make their own decisions, applying their understanding of the ideas on the map. In the first instance, we would suggest that teachers choose contexts which do not make high demands on specialised substantive understanding and where the outcome is not part of prescribed disciplinary content, better still if the outcome is genuinely unknown.
This allows the focus to be on getting good enough data to tell us something and not agreement with a 'right answer' (Allen, 2011 ) -a practice that can give a false impression of science (Driver, Newton & Osborne, 2000) . Springboard is a good example, which can be extended by adopting it as a measuring instrument to address issues of calibration. Freed from substantive content imperatives, a wide range of imaginative contexts with appeal to students are possible: for example, investigating the relationship between the spins of an egg and the length of boiling time (see Gott, Foulds, Roberts, Jones & Johnson, 1999) . Demonstration of an understanding of the interaction amongst the ideas in the map is seen when students carry out trials and 20 work iteratively in response to the data -making nuanced decisions as they workwhich are not features common to illustrative practicals. Shrimp provides opportunities for many different decisions not encountered in most lab-based contexts, thus providing an opportunity for students to develop an understanding of evidence in 'naughty world' contexts where data is 'messy' (Lambert & Reiss, 2014) .
Since ideas about the quality of data have not been explicitly and systematically addressed in customary school science (Abrahams & Reiss, 2012) , we have little empirically-derived data on how students take to them and how a progression in scientific investigation might look. However, we can identify features of an investigation which, from our experience, affects the demand in applying the ideas. A continuous IV entails more decision making than a categoric IV. A reliable DV is easier to deal with than a wayward one. Large changes in the DV and especially in conjunction with high reliability make for a less demanding decision on the number of repeats (i.e. again, the typical 3 may well do). Situations where confounding variables need to be matched are more challenging than those where they can be manipulated.
Sampling of objects with significant variation within their kind brings an additional consideration. How such features of an investigation combine to give an overall difficulty is an empirical question. Even if non-specialised, the substantive context will also be a major factor and it seems likely that a graduated bank of investigations will need to be built up through a case law approach. Of course, in practice, the overall difficulty of an investigation activity can be adjusted by how many decisions are left open to the students. Since the focus is on learning ideas, non-practical teaching activities will also be appropriate; in our experience, explicit teaching of ideas from distinct sections of the map, with ample opportunities for students to discuss the effects of potential decisions in relation to real data and the quality of claims (their own or others') is valuable.
Once students comprehend ideas about the quality of data, as their substantive knowledge develops they should be able to conduct profitable investigations in increasingly more specialised scientific contexts, thereby consolidating their substantive and quality of data understandings in conjunction. This could be seen to be moving towards the goals of inquiry-based learning (Minner, Levy & Century, 2010) and indeed with good enough data students should be able to find out certain relationships between variables for themselves. However, we must emphasise that 21 investigative success is contingent upon already established understanding about the quality of data and sufficient substantive understanding to allow its realisation in context (Glaesser, Gott, Roberts & Cooper, 2009 ). We concur with Hodson (2014) that inquiry-based learning cannot be the principal method for teaching substantive knowledge. Carefully thought through illustrative practical work is needed to support the development of important substantive ideas. Here we must acknowledge that research casts doubt upon the value of much practical work in developing substantive understanding (Abrahams & Millar, 2008; Abrahams & Reiss, 2012) . However, it seems logical that first-hand experiences of phenomena ought to support learning and we suggest their apparent ineffectiveness calls for a rethink of many traditional activities, informed by the research into students' substantive understanding (Johnson & Tymms, 2011) . It is also important to appreciate that many students will not 'pick up' ideas relating to the quality of data simply by following numerous 'recipes' (Gott & Duggan, 1996) . The ideas need direct teaching with a combination of illustrative activities (practical and non-practical, as with substantive ideas), and whole and part investigations where students consider the interplay between the ideas in decision making (see, for instance, Campbell, 2010; Roberts, 2004) . Once students have developed this basic understanding in different contexts they will, arguably, be in a better position to understand the diverse practices and conventions employed across the sciences (Hodson & Wong, 2014) .
In short, teachers must be very clear about the purposes of any particular practical activity (Abrahams & Millar, 2008) , which should be more than a way of appeasing students.
Conclusion
The focus on understanding evidence in recent curriculum documents represents an ontological shift in the characterisation of scientific practice; it is not compatible with a process view with its focus on 'doing' certain skills and processes, and therein lies the danger to its realisation. If the teaching of scientific practice continues to be viewed as associated with processes, the conceptual basis for understanding evidence -the core ideas and their relationships which are shown on the concept map -will be misrepresented and will be lost in curriculum implementation. The ideas of evidence will not be at the explicit heart of teaching and assessment of scientific practice.
22
Deep-rooted customs in school science practice, with its association with a single scientific method, may result in readers of curriculum documents interpreting them in old ways. We would venture to warn that without the ontological shift exemplified here, little may change in practice despite everyone's best intentions.
Our map has gone through many iterations and we make no claims about the version presented here. Its main purpose is in its being a concept map and so emphasising that scientific practice is about ideas to be understood and that can be specified -just like substantive knowledge -and that its teaching should follow accordingly so as to develop learners' understanding of the relationships expressed in the map. ii This involves scuffling at a regular intensity for a known period of time in a defined area to dislodge organisms from the substrate for collection in a net immediately downstream. Some people may consider such a technique to be so disruptive that they would not use it -an interesting ethical dimension that should be considered.
iii Proxy measures are very important in 'historical' sciences, such as geology/earth science and in the study of climate change e.g. tree rings and ice cores as proxy measures of climate conditions (see Hall, 2010) .
iv Identification error is a potential threat to the quality of 'citizen science' surveys and checks on the data are often built into the procedure (Silvertown, 2009 ).
v Non-parametric tests of difference are important for data that are not normally distributed.
vi Not only by 'experiment' -this refers to science's empirical basis.
